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Shapira: "Manna for the Entire World" or "Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor as

"MANNA FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD"* or
"THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOR AS
THYSELF"-COMMENT ON
NEUMEIER v. KUEHNER
Dr. Amos Shapira**
I. A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THiE LAW-FACT PATTERN
DISPLAYED BY THE CASE

A

car, owned and driven by a New York resident and registered
and insured in New York, collided with a train in Ontario,
Canada. Both the New York host-driver and the Ontario guest-passenger were killed in the accident. The Ontario passenger's estate
brought a wrongful death action in New York against the New York
driver's estate. Under New York law, ordinary negligence on the part
of the deceased host-driver would suffice to entitle the guest-passenger's estate to recover damages for wrongful death. Ontario, however, has a guest statute which provides that the owner or driver of a
motor vehicle is not liable for damages resulting from injury to, or
the death of, a guest-passenger unless he was guilty of gross negligence. This law-fact setting pits an Ontario plaintiff, who is suing in
New York on the basis of New York law (the lex fori), against a New
York defendant, who seeks to rely on Ontario law (the lex loci delicti)
as a defense. Could any of those "learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon,"' i.e., Conflict of Laws teachers, ever aspire to construct a tort
conflicts case better suited for classroom discussion?
II. A SUGGESTED FRAME OF ANALYSIS
As a foreigner among the participants of this symposium, I shall
not strive to compete with my distinguished American colleagues in
offering subtle analyses and syntheses of New York case law in the
Tort Choice of Law field. Instead, I shall endeavor to review the case
at hand in terms of a Draft Bill, entitled "Choice of Law in Torts,"
recently drafted and submitted by me to the Israeli Ministry of
* "Was the New York rule really intended to be manna for the entire world?"
Reese, Choice of Law, 71 COLum. L REv. 548, 563 (1971).

** M. Jur. (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem); M.C.L. (Columbia University);
J.S.D. (Yale University). Member of the Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Israel.
1. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mwcsr. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).

168

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 12

Symposium
Justice which is currently considering the possibility of legislating
in the Tort Choice of Law sphere. The Draft Bill, to be utilized
hereinafter as a frame of analysis, reads as follows:
CHoicE oiF LAw IN TORTS

A DRAFT BILL
1. Primafacie
applicability
of local law

When deciding the rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to a tort committed
wholly or partly abroad, a court in Israel
shall apply Israeli law.
Israeli law shall not be displaced by foreign law except as hereinafter provided in
this Act.

2. Displacement of
local law by
foreign law

a. A court entertaining an action in tort
as aforesaid shall not displace Israeli
law by foreign law unless convinced
that, as to the issue or matter at bar, a
foreign law has a closer relationship to
the facts of the case and to the parties
than has Israeli law.
b. When determining whether, as to the
issue or matter at bar, a foreign law has
a closer relationship to the facts of the
case and to the parties than has Israeli
law, the court shall consider chiefly the
tenor and purposes of the laws-Israeli
and foreign-that are proposed to be
applied, as they relate to the facts of the
case and to the parties. For that purpose
the court shall take into account such
factors as:
(1) the place where the injury occurred;
(2) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; and
(3) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.
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3. Foreign law
referring to
another law

If a court decides to apply foreign law as
aforesaid, and it finds that such law would
refer to the law of any other jurisdiction,
the court shall not heed any such reference.

4. Pleadingand proof
of foreign law

a. A party seeking to displace Israeli law
by foreign law as aforesaid, shall bear
the onus of proving the tenor of the foreign law and of convincing the court
that, as to the issue or matter at bar, the
foreign law has a closer relationship to
the facts of the case and to the parties
than has Israeli law.
b. A plea regarding the displacement of
Israeli law by foreign law shall be raised
by an interested party in his pleadings,
and shall be considered and resolved by
the court in a preliminary hearing.
The court may allow a party to raise
a plea as aforesaid even at a later stage
in the proceedings, and it may also postpone its decision in that matter until a
later stage in the proceedings, provided
that the rights of the other party or
parties are not prejudiced.
c. The tenor and purpose of foreign law
shall be proved by means of oral testimony or affidavit given by an expert in
that law. The court may prescribe other
or additional means of proof, if it deems
such means appropriate in the circumstances.

5. Application of
The court shall always apply Israeli law in
local law in matters matters of procedure and evidence.
of procedure and
evidence
6. Foreign law not
to be applied

The court shall not apply foreign law which
discriminates on grounds of sex, race, religion or ethnic origin or which is repugnant
to public policy in Israel.
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In the comments which follow I shall focus on the first two
clauses of the Draft Bill ("Prima facie applicability of local law" and
"Displacement of local law by foreign law"), which are pertinent for
the purposes of the present discussion.
III. PRIMA FACE APPLICABILITY OF THE Lex Fori (NEw YoRK LAw)
The Tort Choice of Law process ought to start from the premise
that the lex fori applies whenever a local forum is adjudicating a tort
committed wholly or partly abroad. The litigants will thus be able
to calculate their steps on the assumption that the forum will invoke
local tort law, the foreign elements involved notwithstanding.
Resorting to the lex fori has obvious practical advantages, it being
conducive to convenience, simplicity, efficiency and economy in the
judicial process. Also, local law is ordinarily bound to have a significant connection with the occurrence or the parties, if a local court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate the cause. As a matter of principle,
moreover, it is the prime responsibility of any forum qua forum to
adjudicate the case before it according to its notions of justice and
reason under law. 2 Hence it would be unreasonable, if not inappropriate, for a local court lightly to dismiss prevailing community ideas
of fairness and reason, as embodied in domestic legal standards, once
foreign factors had been detected in the case at bar. To be sure,
occasionally the ends of justice can best be served by resort to a foreign rule of decision. But the presumption should always be in favor
of the applicability of the lex fori, unless and until a good cause is
shown why a given local legal prescription is inapplicable or some3
how displaced by a foreign rule.
New York's ordinary negligence rule is grounded, no doubt, in a
specific socio-economic interest to secure adequate compensation to
wrongfully injured New York residents. Such interest clearly extends
to afford protection to New Yorkers "injured in a foreign state,
against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state," as cogently observed by Fuld, Ch. J. in Neumeier v. Kuehner.4 But at the same
2. When dealing with obligations, [i.e., contracts and torts] our concern is not
to search for an objective reality, but to do justice on our own responsibility,
according to our own ideas-in other words: by applying our lex Jori, though
taking into account every circumstance (including foreign law) affecting the

expectations . . . of the . . . parties.
A. V. LEvoNTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO TRANSNATIONAI

CONTRACTS 107

(Proceedings, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem 1968).
3. For a detailed elaboration of the grounds, ranging from the empirical to the
philosophical, supporting the case for a lex fori threshold in Conflicts adjudication
see A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREsT APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 49-56 (1970).
4. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (1972).
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time, New York law also reflects a more general interest in providing
fair and reasonable compensation to accident victims, as such, in their
capacity as human beings, even though they may not be blessed with
New York residence. This interest, or rather principle, emanates
from community shaped and shared conventions of justice and expediency, from prevailing societal conceptions as to what constitutes
fair compensatory practices. As such, this principle of justice expresses a "general truth," in the sense of not being inherently restricted to domestic situations and local beneficiaries only. Hence it
is relevant in all locally litigated cases, that is, whenever a New York
forum is able and willing to adjudicate the cause.,
In the light of the foregoing, one cannot accept the assertion made
by Fuld, Ch. J., that "[New York] has no legitimate interest ... in
protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a
vehicle traveling within its borders."6 This assertion totally ignores
the affirmative interest-and-obligation of a New York court, qua
forum, to invoke New York's standards of reasonable care and fair
compensation and to decide the case soundly and justly, on its own
responsibility and irrespective of how an Ontario court might have
decided a similar case. It is no wonder that so limiting a judicial conception has led Fuld, Ch. J. to an avenue of reasoning fraught with
the pitfalls of narrow minded parochialism: "ignoring Ontario's
policy requiring proof of gross negligence in a case which involves
an Ontario-domiciled guest at the expense of a New Yorker does not
further the substantive law purposes of New York." 7 If by "the substantive law purposes" Fuld, Ch. J. wishes to refer to the above
mentioned strictly utilitarian New York interest to compensate New
York accident victims, then, of course, he is absolutely right. But we
have already noted that "the substantive law purposes" of New York
ought to be given a more comprehensive and enlightened reading.
5. "[Tjhe operation of the guest statutes of other jurisdictions," writes Bergan, J.

in his dissenting opinion, "worked out so . . .- unjustly by New York standardsthat in a series of

. .

. decisions . . . this court . . . applied New York law in New

York litigations to motor vehicle torts occurring in other jurisdictions." Later he notes,
with apparent approval "the court's preference for the local rule and a belief in its
greater justice." Id. at 132, 286 N.E.2d at 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
6. Id. at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
7. Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. Contrast this statement with
the broad minded altruistic approach of Bergan, J., dissenting:
What the court is deciding today is that although it will prevent a New York
car owner from asserting the defense of a protective foreign statute when a
New York resident . . . sues; [sic] it has no such "interest" when it accepts
the suit in New York of a nonresident. This is an inadmissible distinction.
Id. at 133, 286 N.E.2d at 461, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
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Opponents of the lex fori threshold idea are prone to raise the
conventional outcry against "forum shopping." The possibility of a
plaintiff being allowed to determine in advance the governing law,
by a tactical selection of a favorable forum, has been deemed by many
as unjust and improper.8 It seems, nonetheless, that the traditional
concern about forum shopping has been grossly overstated. Realistically viewed, the possibility that a party may be able to compel certain legal results by means of a calculated choice of forum may not
be such an inherently outrageous idea. Under current adjudicatory
practices, parties can and do substantially affect the course and ultimate outcome of litigation in many different ways not conceived to
be intolerable.9 Be this as it may, the effective remedy for any presumable evils of forum shopping is not to be found in the storehouse
of choice of law thinking. Choice of law rules provide, at best, an
awkward implement with which to combat forum shopping. The
problem, wherever it exists, should be confronted head on, with the
help of appropriate rules of judicial jurisdiction and rational judicial
utilization of the forum non conveniens doctrine.10 In our case, one
can hardly brand the New York court as a jurisdictionally improper
or inconvenient forum. After all, suing a tortfeasor in his own home
jurisdiction is nothing but fair and reasonable. No possible grounds
of policy or principle appear to militate against the exercise of jurisdiction by a New York forum over a New York defendant.
With the menace of forum shopping out of the way, we may conclude this stage of the analysis by reasserting the prima facie applicability of New York law to the case at hand.
IV. PossIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF THE Lex Fori (NEw YORK LAw)
By FOxEIGN (ONTARo) LAW
The prima facie applicable lex fori may be displaced by foreign
law, if the court entertaining the action is convinced that, as to the
issue at bar, a foreign law has a closer relationship to the facts of the
case and to the parties. When determining whether or not to displace
the prima facie applicable lex fori, the forum will consider the tenor
8. It is not at all uncommon to encounter in Conflicts writings utterances such
as that of Fuld, Ch. J., who sets out to warn us against "sanctioning forum shopping
and thereby allowing a party to select a forum which could give him a larger
recovery than the court of his own domocile." Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335
N.YS.2d at 70-71.
9. On the facts and fancies of the forum shopping phenomenon see Srrsn'A, supra
note 3, at 45.46.
10. For an analysis of the correctives of jurisdictional reform and forum non
coveniens see id. at 46-49.
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and purposes of the local and foreign laws in question, as they relate
to the facts of the case and to the parties.
The "close relationship" criterion is grounded in the view that
legal prescriptions, whether statutory or judge-made in origin, are
generally assumed to express social concerns or public interests, be
they "public policies," "governmental interests," "principles of justice" and the like. Hence the application of the legal standards
adopted by a community entails, indeed requires, a constant probe
into reasons, objectives, underlying policies and principles. The
proper reach of a legal standard in terms of subject-matter, time,
space, and persons covered is a derivative of its underlying purpose,
whether social, economic, humane or otherwise. In a case involving
foreign elements, there is no magic in personal or territorial connecting-factors as such. The relevance or relative significance of any
given connecting-factor is always a function of the facts of the case
(including the identity of the parties) as they relate to the underlying
policy or principle of the legal standards, local and foreign, in question.' It goes without saying that the "dose relationship" formula
falls short of providing a simple, hard-and-fast rule. It establishes a
flexible criterion, which calls for an essentially ad hoc process of
judicial elaboration in the light of the particular law-fact pattern of
each case. Such criterion, nevertheless, offers the judiciary a viable,
workable judicial tool.
Returning to the Neumeier law-fact pattern, it is absolutely clear
11. The "interest" or "functional" approach to Choice of Law represents a conceptual
and methodological revolution in the Conflict of Laws, which aims to replace the old
Conflicts orthodoxy of mechanical directives with more rational and fair decisional
guidelines. This revolution, the offspring of American Conflicts jurisprudence, is now
knocking at the gates of many traditional strongholds of legal conceptualism in Europe.
Under the influence of modem American Conflicts thinking, various legal communities
have started a process of reconsidering the underlying premises of this branch of the
law, with a view to a long overdue reform. Some of them have already taken first,
often hesitant and occasionally reluctant, steps towards the adoption of more flexible
and functional standards for Choice of Law, particularly in the Torts field. See, e.g.,
Chaplin v. Boys [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (per Lords Hodson and Wilberforce); Sayers
v. International Drilling Co. N.V. [1971] W.L.R. 1176, 1180 (per Lord Denning); KahnFreund, Comment, Conflict of Laws-Damages for Tort, 46 CAN. B. REv. 137 (1968);
Webb, Tort in the Conflict of Laws, 16 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 1145 (1967); North & Webb,
Foreign Torts and English Courts: I The Effect of Chaplin v. Boys, 19 INT'L. - CoMiP.
L.Q. 24 (1970); Karsten, Foreign Torts and English Courts: 11 Chaplin v. Boys: Another
Analysis, id. at 35; Reese, Choice of Law in Tort Cases (England: Court of Appeal and
House of Lords), 18 Am. J. CoMp. L. 189 (1970); Lipstein, Conflict of Laws 1921-1971the Wav Ahead, 31 CAMuB. L.J. 67, 113-16 (1972); International Developments in Choice
of Law Governing Torts, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 1-35 (1971); Cavers, Contemporary
Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 1970 (III) REcUE1L DES CoORS 77, 162-70;
Armstrong, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic
Accidents: Search for Uniformity Amidst Doctrinal Diversity, 11 Cotubf. J. TRANSNATL.
L. 74 (1972).
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that Ontario law has no closer relationship (or, indeed, any substantial relationship whatever) to the issue at bar. Ontario's guest statute,
which makes recovery in a host-guest situation conditional upon the
proof of gross negligence, may embody any one or more of the following motivating objectives: to shield automobile liability insurers
against guest-host collusion,'1 2 to protect drivers from excessive liability burdens, 13 to prevent or reduce suits against host-drivers by
ungrateful guest-passengers,' 4 and to accord to other parties possibly
injured in the accident priority over the guest-passenger in the assets, including insurance coverage, of the negligent host-driver.' 5
None of these putative underlying policies is engaged in a case involving no Ontario insurer, host-driver, third-party victim or judicial
institution. Ontario, therefore, can have no possible stake in the
outcome of the controversy at hand. Applying its guest statute in the
circumstances will not further any pertinent Ontario interest, while
resorting to the ordinary negligence rule of New York will not adversely affect any relevant Ontario concern. Ontario, in short, is
totally indifferent to whether the case is decided one way or another.
In consequence, Ontario law can have no possible claim to displace
the prima facie applicable New York law.' 6
Neumeier presents what is characterized in fashionable conflicts
parlance as a "false," or non-existent, conflict between the laws of
New York and Ontario. False conflicts are instances where the forum,
after having examined all potentially relevant interests, arrives at
the conclusion that only one jurisdiction is in truth concerned with
the matter. This will occur where, as here, the legal standard subscribed to by only one concerned jurisdiction (in our case, New York)
is supported by a policy or principle which would be furthered if the
standard is applied to the case in question. Consequently, the interest
12. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E2d 279, 283-85, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 749-51 (1963); A.A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLicr or LAws 578 (1962).
13. See D. CAvERS, THE CHoIcE-oF-LAW PROCESS 152, 296 (1965).
14. Except for willful or wanton misconduct. A gratuitous guest, to whom a courtesy
is being extended by the host-driver, should assume the risk of ordinary negligence
as a matter of "social equity'--Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 53, 87 N.E.2d 87,
89 (1949). See Reese, Choice of Law, 71 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 548, 558 (1971). As a by-product
of this, passengers would become more careful in accepting rides and drivers would
become more generous in offering them.
15. D. CAVERS, supra note 13, at 296.
16. In view of the foregoing functional analysis of Ontario law, one can only wonder
at the admonition voiced by Fuld, Ch. J., to the effect that "New York . . . has no
legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdicton .... ." 31
N.Y.2d at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68. What Ontario "public policy"
is unduly encroached upon by awarding compensation to an Ontario plaintiff, under a
New York legal standard more favorable to accident victims than its Ontario counter-

part?
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of that particular jurisdiction can be vindicated without any impairment to the policies or principles espoused by any other connected
jurisdiction (in our case, Ontario).lr
In sum, the law-fact pattern under discussion does not warrant,
let alone compel, the displacement of New York law by Ontario law.
V.

A

CALCULUS

OF THE PRiVATE INTERESTS AT STAKE

In every case entailing foreign elements one encounters at least
two individual parties whose conflicting claims need to be justly
adjudicated. An approach strictly focusing on public policies or governmental interests is prone to overlook or underplay a fundamental
problem present in many choice-of-law situations: the reasonableness
or fairness of a proposed appraisal of human conduct by foreign legal
norms. This dilemma, typical of conflicts contexts, emanates from a
general reluctance to engage in what may sometimes be regarded as
an unfair process of judging conduct according to the legal standards
of a foreign community. A widely recognized jurisprudential principle calls for a rational connection between the parties to a dispute
and the legal standards by which their conduct is to be judged as a
threshold guarantee of elementary justice in the judicial process. The
criterion for the ascertainment of such a proper connection is ultimately derivable from the sense of reasonableness and fairness possessed by the tribunal adjudicating the cause. Such a criterion may
invoke the overlapping concepts of, among others, "submission and
consent," "foreseeability," "vindication of justified expectations,"
"responsibility to ascertain foreign law," "reasonable reliance," and
"fair notice."'

18

The New York defendant in our case cannot present a good argument in terms of lack of rational connection with New York tort
compensation law. No injustice is worked on a New York car operator, or his insurer, if he is required to live up to the standards of
compensation prevailing in his home jurisdiction. He cannot possibly
claim that he lacked "foreseeability" or "fair notice" as to the applicability of New York negligence law, or that he "submitted" to or
"relied" on the Ontario guest statute when driving his car negligently (we presume) in Ontario. To be sure, the Ontario plaintiff
recovers due to, among other things, the New York identity of the
defendant. But do not victims always take their injurers as they find
17. See B. CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TiE CONFLICT OF LAWS 163, 184, 189 (1963);

Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. Rxv. 1, 8 (1963).
18. See Shapira, Protection of Private Interests in the Choice-of-Law Process: The
Principle of Rational Connection Between Parties and Laws, 24 S.W.L.J. 574 (1970).
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them-rich or poor, with or without insurance coverage, ably or
poorly represented by legal counsel, enjoying or lacking the support
of favorable witnesses, etc.? After all, even windfalls do occur occasionally.
In conclusion, an analysis of all public interests and private
equities at stake in Neumeier v. Kuehner points in one directionthe New York rule of ordinary negligence ought to prevail.
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